Konstantin Kalachev, the pro-Kremlin head of the Political Expert Group, claimed the 87% vote for president Vladimir Putin stemmed from the regimes alignment with the desires of the majority, the most important of which is Russias identity. <\/p>\n
Demands for well-being, justice, and freedom are also important, he wrote in a post on the Nezygar Telegram channel. But they should not clash with the ideals of greatness, dignity, sovereignty, state power and national identity. <\/p>\n
The values listed by Kalachev have been cultivated through propaganda for decades and served as a convenient rationale for war. Putin has repeatedly justified his aggression as necessary to safeguard Russias sovereignty, and pro-Kremlin outlets publish articles arguing that sovereignty and warfare are essentially indivisible. <\/p>\n
Historian Ivan Kurilla, who opposes the war and was dismissed from the European University of St Petersburg at the beginning of March, has observed that the search for an over-arching mission contrasts with the early Putinism of the 2000s, which tried only to foster widespread cynicism and had little pretense of an ideology. <\/p>\n
Propaganda sought to persuade the populace that truth didnt exist, that everyone lied to achieve their objectives so that any values were merely a facade for the real agenda. Kurilla wrote that this stance directly contradicted any attempt to promote an ideology that relies on widespread trust and encouraged ideological opportunism. <\/p>\n
After 2014, when Moscow illegally annexed Ukrainian territory, Kremlin propaganda began promoting geopolitics hard-headed political realism as a primary reason for its actions. For those unwilling to swallow propagandistic myths like the claim that there are no Russian military personnel in Ukraine, their presence was justified by geopolitical benefits. <\/p>\n
Pro-Kremlin ideologists began asserting that Russian geopolitics served as a driving force for transformation to a multipolar world, with some openly advocating that geopolitics should supplant ideology. <\/p>\n
In doing so, they infused the term with ideological content, arguing that geopolitics is a worldview, with the primary criterion being the confrontation between maritime and land civilizations (which sounds like a 100-year-old Russo-Germanic attempt to differentiate themselves from the maritime realm of the US and Britain.) <\/p>\n
On the one hand, the assertion that a policy is beneficial for us is inherently cynical, particularly when it comes to starting wars and killing civilians. On the other hand, the target audience for such propaganda is expected to possess a fervent belief that such conduct on the international stage is advantageous to Russia. <\/p>\n
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Six years ago, I termed this phenomenon ideological cynicism the establishment of a cult of geopolitics which, while cynical, remains fundamentally ideological in nature. <\/p>\n
Even with the rise of this cult, Russians didnt immediately associate it with notions of national greatness. Surveys in 2018 indicated that the majority prioritized economic prosperity over national prestige. <\/p>\n
Political scientist Kirill Rogov now living in exile suggests that in recent years a new Russian ideology has emerged that can be tentatively labeled kleptofascism. According to Rogov, this doctrine combines traditional methods of elite consolidation, based on kleptocratic mercantilism, with the demand for unwavering loyalty to a militarist-nationalist anti-Western ideology. <\/p>\n
He argues that the loyalty of the elite isnt achieved through ideologization but rather their complicity in war crimes and the assets stolen as a result. The Kremlins confidence in the general populations support is also shaky, and the fictitious support of 87% for Putin in the election stems from this uncertainty, he said. <\/p>\n
From the regimes standpoint, there are real issues to worry about. Opposition, real or potential, resides among several significant and identifiable groups. <\/p>\n
Kurilla observes that ideological opportunists are fundamentally unhappy with forced ideologization, particularly when it involves their children. Alongside liberals and a dissatisfied faction of conservative coalition supporters, they may eventually voice dissent against the authorities actions. <\/p>\n
Another group likely to express dissatisfaction is residents of the occupied territories of Ukraine. Russian and Western observers consistently report how Ukrainians are coerced into acquiring Russian citizenship without which they face the denial of pensions, benefits, and even medical assistance. <\/p>\n
Additionally, there is an active policy of population laundering, where citizens and children in the occupied territories are pushed to go to Russia, while these areas are simultaneously repopulated with Russians. Practices such as torture, abduction, and a refusal to rebuild destroyed housing are inflicted on disloyal residents. Its clear that if the repressive apparatus weakens, the discontent of the occupied population will surge. <\/p>\n
The regimes kleptocratic nature also hinders ideologization. Laws proposed in the State Duma in February, except for a handful of repressive measures, were all developed to benefit specific deputies. <\/p>\n
While this may not faze the cynical majority in Russian society, it can instill doubt among young people who have not yet been inoculated with cynicism. Those ordered to sacrifice themselves at the regimes behest, only to become disillusioned, will undoubtedly form a significant portion of the future coalition of the discontented. <\/p>\n
Kseniya Kirillova is an analyst focused on Russian society, mentality, propaganda, and foreign policy.The author of numerous articles for CEPA and the Jamestown Foundation, she has also written for the Atlantic Council, Stratfor, and others. <\/p>\n
Europes Edgeis CEPAs online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or viewsof the institutions they representor the Center for European Policy Analysis. <\/p>\n
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Putin and the Superiority Myth - Center for European Policy Analysis<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Konstantin Kalachev, the pro-Kremlin head of the Political Expert Group, claimed the 87% vote for president Vladimir Putin stemmed from the regimes alignment with the desires of the majority, the most important of which is Russias identity. Demands for well-being, justice, and freedom are also important, he wrote in a post on the Nezygar Telegram channel Continue reading