{"id":1117511,"date":"2023-09-01T05:29:52","date_gmt":"2023-09-01T09:29:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/uncategorized\/speech-by-chair-powell-on-the-economic-outlook-federal-reserve\/"},"modified":"2023-09-01T05:29:52","modified_gmt":"2023-09-01T09:29:52","slug":"speech-by-chair-powell-on-the-economic-outlook-federal-reserve","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/progress\/speech-by-chair-powell-on-the-economic-outlook-federal-reserve\/","title":{"rendered":"Speech by Chair Powell on the economic outlook &#8211; Federal Reserve"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>    Good morning. At last year's Jackson Hole symposium, I    delivered a brief, direct message. My remarks this year will be    a bit longer, but the message is the same: It is the Fed's job    to bring inflation down to our 2 percent goal, and we will do    so. We have tightened policy significantly over the past year.    Although inflation has moved down from its peaka welcome    developmentit remains too high. We are prepared to raise rates    further if appropriate, and intend to hold policy at a    restrictive level until we are confident that inflation is    moving sustainably down toward our objective.  <\/p>\n<p>    Today I will review our progress so far and discuss the outlook    and the uncertainties we face as we pursue our dual mandate    goals. I will conclude with a summary of what this means for    policy. Given how far we have come, at upcoming meetings we are    in a position to proceed carefully as we assess the incoming    data and the evolving outlook and risks.  <\/p>\n<p>    The Decline in Inflation So Far    The ongoing episode of high inflation initially emerged from a    collision between very strong demand and pandemic-constrained    supply. By the time the Federal Open Market Committee raised    the policy rate in March 2022, it was clear that bringing down    inflation would depend on both the unwinding of the    unprecedented pandemic-related demand and supply distortions    and on our tightening of monetary policy, which would slow the    growth of aggregate demand, allowing supply time to catch up.    While these two forces are now working together to bring down    inflation, the process still has a long way to go, even with    the more favorable recent readings.  <\/p>\n<p>    On a 12-month basis, U.S. total, or \"headline,\" PCE (personal    consumption expenditures) inflation peaked at 7 percent in June    2022 and declined to 3.3 percent as of July, following a    trajectory roughly in line with global trends (figure 1, panel    A).1 The    effects of Russia's war against Ukraine have been a primary    driver of the changes in headline inflation around the world    since early 2022. Headline inflation is what households and    businesses experience most directly, so this decline is very    good news. But food and energy prices are influenced by global    factors that remain volatile, and can provide a misleading    signal of where inflation is headed. In my remaining comments,    I will focus on core PCE inflation, which omits the food and    energy components.  <\/p>\n<p>    On a 12-month basis, core PCE inflation peaked at 5.4 percent    in February 2022 and declined gradually to 4.3 percent in July    (figure 1, panel B). The lower monthly readings for core    inflation in June and July were welcome, but two months of good    data are only the beginning of what it will take to build    confidence that inflation is moving down sustainably toward our    goal. We can't yet know the extent to which these lower    readings will continue or where underlying inflation will    settle over coming quarters. Twelve-month core inflation is    still elevated, and there is substantial further ground to    cover to get back to price stability.  <\/p>\n<p>    To understand the factors that will likely drive further    progress, it is useful to separately examine the three broad    components of core PCE inflationinflation for goods, for    housing services, and for all other services, sometimes    referred to as nonhousing services (figure 2).  <\/p>\n<p>    Core goods inflation has fallen sharply, particularly for    durable goods, as both tighter monetary policy and the slow    unwinding of supply and demand dislocations are bringing it    down. The motor vehicle sector provides a good illustration.    Earlier in the pandemic, demand for vehicles rose sharply,    supported by low interest rates, fiscal transfers, curtailed    spending on in-person services, and shifts in preference away    from using public transportation and from living in cities. But    because of a shortage of semiconductors, vehicle supply    actually fell. Vehicle prices spiked, and a large pool of    pent-up demand emerged. As the pandemic and its effects have    waned, production and inventories have grown, and supply has    improved. At the same time, higher interest rates have weighed    on demand. Interest rates on auto loans have nearly doubled    since early last year, and customers report feeling the effect    of higher rates on affordability.2 On net,    motor vehicle inflation has declined sharply because of the    combined effects of these supply and demand factors.  <\/p>\n<p>    Similar dynamics are playing out for core goods inflation    overall. As they do, the effects of monetary restraint should    show through more fully over time. Core goods prices fell the    past two months, but on a 12-month basis, core goods inflation    remains well above its pre-pandemic level. Sustained progress    is needed, and restrictive monetary policy is called for to    achieve that progress.  <\/p>\n<p>    In the highly interest-sensitive housing sector, the effects of    monetary policy became apparent soon after liftoff. Mortgage    rates doubled over the course of 2022, causing housing starts    and sales to fall and house price growth to plummet. Growth in    market rents soon peaked and then steadily declined    (figure 3).3  <\/p>\n<p>    Measured housing services inflation lagged these changes, as is    typical, but has recently begun to fall. This inflation metric    reflects rents paid by all tenants, as well as estimates of the    equivalent rents that could be earned from homes that are owner    occupied.4 Because    leases turn over slowly, it takes time for a decline in market    rent growth to work its way into the overall inflation measure.    The market rent slowdown has only recently begun to show    through to that measure. The slowing growth in rents for new    leases over roughly the past year can be thought of as \"in the    pipeline\" and will affect measured housing services inflation    over the coming year. Going forward, if market rent growth    settles near pre-pandemic levels, housing services inflation    should decline toward its pre-pandemic level as well. We will    continue to watch the market rent data closely for a signal of    the upside and downside risks to housing services inflation.  <\/p>\n<p>    The final category, nonhousing services, accounts for over half    of the core PCE index and includes a broad range of services,    such as health care, food services, transportation, and    accommodations. Twelve-month inflation in this sector has moved    sideways since liftoff. Inflation measured over the past three    and six months has declined, however, which is encouraging.    Part of the reason for the modest decline of nonhousing    services inflation so far is that many of these services were    less affected by global supply chain bottlenecks and are    generally thought to be less interest sensitive than other    sectors such as housing or durable goods. Production of these    services is also relatively labor intensive, and the labor    market remains tight. Given the size of this sector, some    further progress here will be essential to restoring price    stability. Over time, restrictive monetary policy will help    bring aggregate supply and demand back into better balance,    reducing inflationary pressures in this key sector.  <\/p>\n<p>    The Outlook    Turning to the outlook, although further unwinding of    pandemic-related distortions should continue to put some    downward pressure on inflation, restrictive monetary policy    will likely play an increasingly important role. Getting    inflation sustainably back down to 2 percent is expected to    require a period of below-trend economic growth as well as some    softening in labor market conditions.  <\/p>\n<p>    Economic growth    Restrictive monetary policy has tightened financial conditions,    supporting the expectation of below-trend growth.5    Since last year's symposium, the two-year real yield is up    about 250 basis points, and longer-term real yields are higher    as wellby nearly 150 basis points.6 Beyond    changes in interest rates, bank lending standards have    tightened, and loan growth has slowed sharply.7    Such a tightening of broad financial conditions typically    contributes to a slowing in the growth of economic activity,    and there is evidence of that in this cycle as well. For    example, growth in industrial production has slowed, and the    amount spent on residential investment has declined in each of    the past five quarters (figure 4).  <\/p>\n<p>    But we are attentive to signs that the economy may not be    cooling as expected. So far this year, GDP (gross domestic    product) growth has come in above expectations and above its    longer-run trend, and recent readings on consumer spending have    been especially robust. In addition, after decelerating sharply    over the past 18 months, the housing sector is showing signs of    picking back up. Additional evidence of persistently    above-trend growth could put further progress on inflation at    risk and could warrant further tightening of monetary policy.  <\/p>\n<p>    The labor market    The rebalancing of the labor market has continued over the past    year but remains incomplete. Labor supply has improved, driven    by stronger participation among workers aged 25 to 54 and by an    increase in immigration back toward pre-pandemic levels.    Indeed, the labor force participation rate of women in their    prime working years reached an all-time high in June. Demand    for labor has moderated as well. Job openings remain high but    are trending lower. Payroll job growth has slowed    significantly. Total hours worked has been flat over the past    six months, and the average workweek has declined to the lower    end of its pre-pandemic range, reflecting a gradual    normalization in labor market conditions (figure 5).  <\/p>\n<p>    This rebalancing has eased wage pressures. Wage growth across a    range of measures continues to slow, albeit gradually    (figure 6). While nominal wage growth must ultimately    slow to a rate that is consistent with 2 percent inflation,    what matters for households is real wage growth. Even as    nominal wage growth has slowed, real wage growth has been    increasing as inflation has fallen.  <\/p>\n<p>    We expect this labor market rebalancing to continue. Evidence    that the tightness in the labor market is no longer easing    could also call for a monetary policy response.  <\/p>\n<p>    Uncertainty and Risk Management along the Path    Forward    Two percent is and will remain our inflation target. We are    committed to achieving and sustaining a stance of monetary    policy that is sufficiently restrictive to bring inflation down    to that level over time. It is challenging, of course, to know    in real time when such a stance has been achieved. There are    some challenges that are common to all tightening cycles. For    example, real interest rates are now positive and well above    mainstream estimates of the neutral policy rate. We see the    current stance of policy as restrictive, putting downward    pressure on economic activity, hiring, and inflation. But we    cannot identify with certainty the neutral rate of interest,    and thus there is always uncertainty about the precise level of    monetary policy restraint.  <\/p>\n<p>    That assessment is further complicated by uncertainty about the    duration of the lags with which monetary tightening affects    economic activity and especially inflation. Since the symposium    a year ago, the Committee has raised the policy rate by 300    basis points, including 100 basis points over the past seven    months. And we have substantially reduced the size of our    securities holdings. The wide range of estimates of these lags    suggests that there may be significant further drag in the    pipeline.  <\/p>\n<p>    Beyond these traditional sources of policy uncertainty, the    supply and demand dislocations unique to this cycle raise    further complications through their effects on inflation and    labor market dynamics. For example, so far, job openings have    declined substantially without increasing unemploymenta highly    welcome but historically unusual result that appears to reflect    large excess demand for labor. In addition, there is evidence    that inflation has become more responsive to labor market    tightness than was the case in recent decades.8    These changing dynamics may or may not persist, and this    uncertainty underscores the need for agile policymaking.  <\/p>\n<p>    These uncertainties, both old and new, complicate our task of    balancing the risk of tightening monetary policy too much    against the risk of tightening too little. Doing too little    could allow above-target inflation to become entrenched and    ultimately require monetary policy to wring more persistent    inflation from the economy at a high cost to employment. Doing    too much could also do unnecessary harm to the economy.  <\/p>\n<p>    Conclusion    As is often the case, we are navigating by the stars under    cloudy skies. In such circumstances, risk-management    considerations are critical. At upcoming meetings, we will    assess our progress based on the totality of the data and the    evolving outlook and risks. Based on this assessment, we will    proceed carefully as we decide whether to tighten further or,    instead, to hold the policy rate constant and await further    data. Restoring price stability is essential to achieving both    sides of our dual mandate. We will need price stability to    achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions    that benefit all.  <\/p>\n<p>    We will keep at it until the job is done.  <\/p>\n<p>    1. Descriptions of PCE inflation    include Board staff estimates of the July 2023 values based on    available information, including the July 2023 consumer price    index and producer price index data. The July 2023 PCE    inflation data will be published by the Bureau of Economic    Analysis on August 31, 2023. Return to text  <\/p>\n<p>    2. For example, 25 percent of    respondents to the most recent University of Michigan Surveys    of Consumers reported that it is currently a bad time to buy a    new vehicle because of higher interest rates and tighter credit    conditions, up from only 4 percent of respondents in 2021. For    more information, see the preliminary results of the August    2023 survey, available on the University of Michigan's website    at <a href=\"http:\/\/www.sca.isr.umich.edu\" rel=\"nofollow\">http:\/\/www.sca.isr.umich.edu<\/a>.    Return to text  <\/p>\n<p>    3. This slowing in rent growth has    likely occurred for a combination of reasons. Some of it likely    reflects higher interest rates and the softening in real    household income growth over the past couple of years. But the    normalization of dislocations due to the pandemic is likely    playing a role here as well. For example, the shifts in housing    preferences related to working from home likely contributed to    the increase in housing demand reflected in the sizable earlier    increases in rents. As the price effects of that demand shift    played out, the growth rate of rents would naturally decline    toward its earlier trend. Finally, multifamily construction is    quite high by historical standards, and that supply coming on    line has likely also taken some pressure off market rents.    Return to text  <\/p>\n<p>    4. PCE prices for housing services    include both the rents paid by tenants and an imputed rental    value for owner-occupied dwellings (measured as the income the    homeowner could have received if the house had been rented to a    tenant). For additional details, see Bureau of Economic    Analysis (2022), \"Rental    Income of Persons (PDF),\" in NIPA Handbook: Concepts    and Methods of the U.S. National Income and Product    Accounts (Washington: BEA, December), pp. 12-112-15.    Return to text  <\/p>\n<p>    5. For an example of how tighter    financial conditions affect economic activity, see the Federal    Reserve Board staff's new index measuring U.S. financial    conditions through their effect on the outlook for growth; the    index is discussed in Andrea Ajello, Michele Cavallo, Giovanni    Favara, William B. Peterman, John W. Schindler IV, and Nitish    R. Sinha (2023), \"A    New Index to Measure U.S. Financial Conditions,\" FEDS Notes    (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,    June 30). Return to text  <\/p>\n<p>    6. Changes in real yields cited in    this sentence refer to changes in yields on 2- and 10-year    Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities. Return    to text  <\/p>\n<p>    7. In addition, as the policy rate    increased, nonbanking lending conditions changed as well. For    example, beginning in 2022 and continuing into the first half    of this year, net issuance of riskier debtsuch as leveraged    loans and speculative-grade and unrated corporate bondsin    public credit markets declined. Return to    text  <\/p>\n<p>    8. The relationship between labor    market slack and inflation, often called the Phillips curve    relationship, is likely nonlinear, steepening in a tight labor    market. If the Phillips curve has steepened in this way, a    small change in labor market tightness could result in a more    substantial change in inflation. It is difficult to know with    precision how steep that relationship is in real time or how it    might evolve as labor market tightness changes. For more    information on nonlinearities in this relationship, see    Christoph E. Boehm and Nitya Pandalai-Nayar (2022), \"Convex    Supply Curves,\" American Economic Review, vol. 112    (December), pp. 394169; Pierpaolo Benigno and Gauti B.    Eggertsson (2023), \"It's    Baaack: The Surge in Inflation in the 2020s and the Return of    the Non-Linear Phillips Curve (PDF),\" NBER Working Paper    Series 31197 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic    Research, April); and Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau, Lu Zhang, and    Lars-Alexander Kuehn (2018), \"Endogenous Disasters,\"    American Economic Review, vol. 108 (August), pp.    221245. Return to text  <\/p>\n<p><!-- Auto Generated --><\/p>\n<p>The rest is here:<\/p>\n<p><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.federalreserve.gov\/newsevents\/speech\/powell20230825a.htm\" title=\"Speech by Chair Powell on the economic outlook - Federal Reserve\">Speech by Chair Powell on the economic outlook - Federal Reserve<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p> Good morning. At last year's Jackson Hole symposium, I delivered a brief, direct message.  <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/progress\/speech-by-chair-powell-on-the-economic-outlook-federal-reserve\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[187725],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1117511","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-progress"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1117511"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1117511"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1117511\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1117511"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1117511"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/prometheism-transhumanism-posthumanism\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1117511"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}