{"id":75161,"date":"2013-03-28T16:56:27","date_gmt":"2013-03-28T20:56:27","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/uncategorized\/nasa-oig-review-of-nasa-s-explosives-safety-program.php"},"modified":"2013-03-28T16:56:27","modified_gmt":"2013-03-28T20:56:27","slug":"nasa-oig-review-of-nasa-s-explosives-safety-program","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/nasa\/nasa-oig-review-of-nasa-s-explosives-safety-program.php","title":{"rendered":"NASA OIG: Review of NASA &#8216;s Explosives Safety Program"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>    Full    Report  <\/p>\n<p>    NASA Inspector General Paul Martin today released a report that    assesses the Agency's efforts to protect its people, property,    and the general public from the potentially catastrophic    effects of explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics -    collectively known as energetic materials. From launching    vehicles into space to the successful landing of the Curiosity    rover on Mars, energetic materials are an integral part of many    NASA missions.    This Office of Inspector General (OIG) review found that NASA's    Explosives Safety Program was poorly managed and exposed    personnel and facilities to unnecessary risk. Specifically, we    identified 155 violations of regulations, policies, procedures,    and processes involving unsafe conditions and practices - some    of which could have resulted in significant damage, injury, or    death to NASA personnel, contractors, and the public.    For example, we found incompatible explosive materials stored    in the same location, unsafe distances between occupied    buildings and storage facilities containing energetic    materials, inaccurate or incomplete inventories of energetic    materials, and improper inspection procedures for vehicles used    to transport these materials. In our judgment, a lack of    oversight, resources, and training at both the local and    Headquarters level contributed to the deficiencies we    identified.    At Stennis Space Center, we identified a building that did not    meet the basic requirements for storing explosive materials -    namely, it lacked adequate firewalls, operational shields, a    blast-resistant roof, and containment structures. Moreover, the    building was being used to store incompatible energetic    materials. Because personnel did not appropriately account for    the combined effects of these materials, the safe separation    distance between the energetic materials and an adjoining    building was miscalculated. According to OIG estimates, if the    stored materials had detonated more than 40 percent of the    occupied building would have sustained structural damage and 15    percent of the personnel inside could have sustained fatal    injuries.    At the Wallops Flight Facility, which stores approximately    100,000 pounds of high-order, mass detonating explosive    materials, we observed hundreds of rockets containing    potentially explosive propellant stacked in close proximity to    each other in bunkers. NASA personnel we spoke with had never    assessed the physical condition of these rockets, all of which    were manufactured between the late 1950s and early 1970s. The    stacked placement, coupled with the unknown condition of the    propellant, increased the probability of a catastrophic event    because a single rocket igniting or exploding could have set    off a chain-reaction of detonations.    At NASA's White Sands Test Facility the OIG observed two    shipping crates containing lead azide that appeared to be    decomposing and therefore had potentially become highly    unstable and sensitive to any sudden movement.    To NASA's credit, personnel at each site quickly addressed the    issues we uncovered that presented an immediate threat to    personnel and facilities.    To improve NASA's Explosives Safety Program and better ensure    the safety and protection of personnel, property and the    environment the OIG made seven recommendations, including that    NASA initiate a review of management, storage, and handling    procedures at all Centers and Facilities to identify    deficiencies, take corrective actions, and share best    practices; immediately conduct an Agency-wide inventory of    energetic materials and initiate an investigation of any    missing materials; and correct deficiencies regarding the    qualifications and training of personnel who work in the    Program. NASA concurred with the recommendations.    The full report can be found on the OIG's website at    <a href=\"http:\/\/oig.nasa.gov\/\" rel=\"nofollow\">http:\/\/oig.nasa.gov\/<\/a> under \"Reading Room\" or at the following    link:     <a href=\"http:\/\/www.hq.nasa.gov\/office\/oig\/hq\/audits\/reports\/FY13\/IG-13-013.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow\">http:\/\/www.hq.nasa.gov\/office\/oig\/hq\/audits\/reports\/FY13\/IG-13-013.pdf<\/a>    Please contact Renee Juhans at (202) 358-1220 if you have    questions.  <\/p>\n<p>    Please follow SpaceRef on Twitter and Like us on    Facebook.  <\/p>\n<p><!-- Auto Generated --><\/p>\n<p>See the original post here:<\/p>\n<p><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.spaceref.com\/news\/viewsr.html?pid=43664\" title=\"NASA OIG: Review of NASA 's Explosives Safety Program\">NASA OIG: Review of NASA 's Explosives Safety Program<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p> Full Report NASA Inspector General Paul Martin today released a report that assesses the Agency's efforts to protect its people, property, and the general public from the potentially catastrophic effects of explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics - collectively known as energetic materials. From launching vehicles into space to the successful landing of the Curiosity rover on Mars, energetic materials are an integral part of many NASA missions. This Office of Inspector General (OIG) review found that NASA's Explosives Safety Program was poorly managed and exposed personnel and facilities to unnecessary risk.  <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/nasa\/nasa-oig-review-of-nasa-s-explosives-safety-program.php\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"limit_modified_date":"","last_modified_date":"","_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[20],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-75161","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-nasa"],"modified_by":null,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75161"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75161"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75161\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75161"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75161"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75161"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}