Stefan Molyneux is a popular libertarian broadcaster who has in recent years acquired a considerable following. In Universally Preferable Behavior, he takes on an ambitious task. He endeavors to provide a rational basis for morality. Should he succeed, he would not only have achieved something of monumental importance; he would also have rendered a great service to libertarianism. Molyneux's system of morality has resolutely libertarian implications. If he is right, surely a time for rejoicing is at hand. <\/p>\n
It would be cruel to arouse false expectations, so I had better say at once that Molyneux does not succeed in his noble goal. He fails, and fails miserably. His arguments are often preposterously bad. <\/p>\n
Let us first be clear, in his own words, on what Molyneux wishes to accomplish: <\/p>\n
The question before us is thus: can some preferences be objective, i.e., universal? When I talk about universal preferences, I am talking about what people should prefer, not what they always do prefer. (p. 33, emphasis omitted) <\/p>\n
These preferences, furthermore, have to do with morality, behavior that can be forcibly imposed on people. \"Those preferences which can be considered binding upon others can be termed 'universal preferences' or 'moral rules'\" (p. 40). <\/p>\n
Is there, then, behavior that is in his sense universally preferable? Our ever-generous author has an abundance of arguments in support of a positive answer to this question. His first claim is that the very fact of engaging in inquiry over the existence of universally preferable behavior suffices to answer the question in the affirmative. If I am engaged in debate about this topic, must I not prefer truth to falsehood? An attempt to deny this leads to contradiction: \"If I argue against the proposition that universally preferable behavior is valid, I have already shown my preference for truth over falsehood as well as a preference for correcting those who speak falsely\" (p. 40). <\/p>\n
Molyneux is certainly right that someone who wants to discover whether universally preferable behavior exists, prefers, while trying to find the answer, truth over falsehood; but how does this generate a preference to correct others with mistaken views? Molyneux wrongly supposes that if someone wants to discover the truth, he must be in engaged in an actual debate with someone else. Why must he? Further, what has any of this to do with enforceable obligations, the ostensible subject of his inquiry? <\/p>\n
Molyneux has many more arguments on offer. How can we deny the existence of universally preferable behavior, he asks: does not life itself depend on it? \"Thus it is impossible that anyone can logically argue against universally preferable behavior, since if he is alive to argue, he must have followed universally preferable behaviors such as breathing, eating and drinking.\" <\/p>\n
Is it not obvious that Molyneux has confused two different senses of \"universally preferable behavior\"? Biological laws are, as even our author elsewhere realizes, descriptive regularities; Molyneux fails utterly to show that acting in accord with such laws to keep oneself alive has anything to do with moral obligation. <\/p>\n
Molyneux is not content with \"proving\" that moral obligations exist. He also has distinctive views about the nature of these obligations. Moral rules must be universal, in a very strong sense: <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
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The Molyneux Problem<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Stefan Molyneux is a popular libertarian broadcaster who has in recent years acquired a considerable following. In Universally Preferable Behavior, he takes on an ambitious task Continue reading