Researchers from Politecnico di Milano and Trend Micro conducted an audit of the information security design of commonly used industrial robots and found that these devices are extremely insecure: robots could be easily reprogrammed to violate their safety parameters, both by distorting the robots' ability to move accurately and by changing the movements the robots attempt to perform; hacked robots can also be made to perform movements with more force than is safe; normal safety measures that limit speed and force can be disabled; robots can be made to falsify their own telemetry, fooling human operators; emergency manual override switches can be disabled or hidden; robots can be silently switched from manual to automatic operation, making them move suddenly and forcefully while dangerously close to oblivious, trusting humans; and of course, robots can be caused to manufacture faulty goods that have to be remanufactured or scrapped. <\/p>\n
All of this is possible because industrial robotic control systems lack even the most basic security -- instead of cryptographically hashing passwords, they store them in the clear (with a single, deterministic XOR operation to provide a useless hurdle against hackers); controllers expose an FTP process during bootup that accepts new firmware loads without authentication; network-level commands are not encrypted or signed; controllers use hardcoded usernames and passwords; memory corruption attacks are easy and devastating; the runtimes for the control instructions are poorly isolated from other processes -- the paper goes on and on. <\/p>\n
Industrial robots epitomize all the problems of the Internet of Shit -- operators who have little or no security expertise, a lack of easy updating, and lazy, sloppy design. But whereas killing someone with the Internet of Shit involves things like turning off the heat in February in Minnesota, industrial robots are giant, barely constrained killing machines. <\/p>\n
We explored, theoretically and experimentally, the challenges and impacts of the security of modern industrial robots. We built an attacker model, and showed how an attacker can compromise a robot controller and gain full control of the robot, altering the production process. We explored the potential impacts of such attacks and experimentally evaluated the resilience of a widespread model of industrial robot (representative of a de facto standard architecture) against cyber attacks. We then discussed the domain-specific barriers that make smooth adoption of countermeasures a challenging task. <\/p>\n
Interesting future research directions include exploring multi-robot deployments, co-bots, and the safety and security implications of the adoption of wireless connections. Also, an improved survey would produce statistically significant results. We definitely plan to analyze controllers from other vendors, to further confirm the generality of our approach. <\/p>\n
An Experimental Security Analysis of an Industrial Robot Controller [Davide Quarta, Marcello Pogliani, Mario Polino, Federico Maggi, Andrea Maria Zanchettin, and Stefano Zanero\/Industrial Robots Security] <\/p>\n
(via 4 Short Links) <\/p>\n
University of Tulsa security researchers Jason Staggs and his colleagues will present Adventures in Attacking Wind Farm Control Networks at this years Black Hat conference, detailing the work they did penetration-testing windfarms. <\/p>\n
Yesterdays massive ransomware outbreak of a mutant, NSA-supercharged strain of the Petya malware is still spreading, but the malwares author made a mere $10K off it and will likely not see a penny more, because Posteo, the German email provider the crook used for ransom payment negotiations, shut down their account. <\/p>\n
Petya is a well-known ransomware app that has attained a new, deadly virulence, with thousands of new infection attempts hitting Kaspersky Labs honeypots; security firm Avira attributes this new hardiness to the incorporation of EternalBlue the same NSA cyberweapon that the Wannacry ransomware used, which was published by The Shadow Brokers hacker group [] <\/p>\n
Despite the upfront cost, electric toothbrushes are much better at removing plaque than those freebies from the dentists office. For those who struggle to fill the American Dental Associations recommended two minutes of brushing time, or anyone with limited dexterity, a sonic toothbrush can give your oral care routine a boost.To keep your chops healthy [] <\/p>\n
Learning a new language will give your resume an upgrade, sure, but it will also provide a huge cognitive boost for mental tasks outside of translation and conversation. Bilingual brains have been shown to be better at handling multiple concurrent tasks, and gaining fluency in a new tongue is an amazing way to improve memory, [] <\/p>\n
If you struggle to get a good nights rest, consider replacing your pillows before dropping hundreds on a new mattress. You can give your tired neck a break with a 2-pack of memory foam pillows, available now in the Boing Boing Store.Each of these pillows is stuffed with cooling polyurethane foam that molds to your [] <\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Originally posted here:<\/p>\n
Industrial robotics security is really, really terrible \/ Boing Boing - Boing Boing<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Researchers from Politecnico di Milano and Trend Micro conducted an audit of the information security design of commonly used industrial robots and found that these devices are extremely insecure: robots could be easily reprogrammed to violate their safety parameters, both by distorting the robots' ability to move accurately and by changing the movements the robots attempt to perform; hacked robots can also be made to perform movements with more force than is safe; normal safety measures that limit speed and force can be disabled; robots can be made to falsify their own telemetry, fooling human operators; emergency manual override switches can be disabled or hidden; robots can be silently switched from manual to automatic operation, making them move suddenly and forcefully while dangerously close to oblivious, trusting humans; and of course, robots can be caused to manufacture faulty goods that have to be remanufactured or scrapped. All of this is possible because industrial robotic control systems lack even the most basic security -- instead of cryptographically hashing passwords, they store them in the clear (with a single, deterministic XOR operation to provide a useless hurdle against hackers); controllers expose an FTP process during bootup that accepts new firmware loads without authentication; network-level commands are not encrypted or signed; controllers use hardcoded usernames and passwords; memory corruption attacks are easy and devastating; the runtimes for the control instructions are poorly isolated from other processes -- the paper goes on and on. Industrial robots epitomize all the problems of the Internet of Shit -- operators who have little or no security expertise, a lack of easy updating, and lazy, sloppy design Continue reading