3isminthewaythatpost-ChristianWesterncivilizationhasdone.Aristotle's view is that we have duties to ourselvesas well as to other people (e.g. friends) and to the <\/p>\n
polis <\/p>\n
asa whole. The same is true forThomas Aquinas,Christian WolandImmanuelKant,whoclaimthatthereareduties to ourselves as Aristotle did, although it has been arguedthat, for Aristotle, the duty to ones self is primary. <\/p>\n
[17] <\/p>\n
Ayn Randargued that there is a positive harmony of in-terests among free, rational humans, such that no moralagent can rationally coerce another person consistentlywith his own long-term self-interest. Rand argued thatother people are an enormous value to an individualswell-being (through education, trade and aection), butalso that this value could be fully realized only under con-ditions of political and economic freedom. According toRand, voluntary trade alone can assure that human inter-action is <\/p>\n
mutually <\/p>\n
benecial. <\/p>\n
[18] <\/p>\n
Rands student,LeonardPeikohas argued that the identication of ones inter-ests itself is impossible absent the use of principles, andthat self-interest cannot be consistently pursued absent aconsistent adherence to certain ethical principles. <\/p>\n
[19] <\/p>\n
Re-cently, Rands position has also been defended by suchwriters asTara Smith,Tibor Machan,Allan Gotthelf, David Kelley,Douglas Rasmussen,Nathaniel Branden, Harry Binswanger,Andrew Bernstein, andCraig Biddle. PhilosopherDavid L. Nortonidentied himself an ethi-calindividualist,and, likeRand, sawaharmonybetweenan individuals delity to his own self-actualization, orpersonal destiny, and the achievement of societys wellbeing. <\/p>\n
[20] <\/p>\n
5 Criticisms <\/p>\n
Accordingtoamoralism,thereisnothingwrongwithego-ism, but there is also nothing ethical about it; one canadoptrational egoismand drop morality as a superuousattribute of the egoism.Ethical egoism has been alleged as the basis forimmorality. Egoism has also been alleged as being out-side the scope of moral philosophy.Thomas Jeersonwrites in an 1814 letter to Thomas Law:Self-interest, orratherself-love, oregoism,hasbeenmoreplausiblysubstitutedasthebasisof morality. But I consider our relations withothers as constituting the boundaries of moral-ity. With ourselves, we stand on the groundof identity, not of relation, which last, requir-ing two subjects, excludes self-love connedto a single one. To ourselves, in strict lan-guage, we can owe no duties, obligation re-quiring also two parties. Self-love, therefore,is no part of morality. Indeed, it is exactly itscounterpart. <\/p>\n
[21] <\/p>\n
In contrast, Rand saw ethics as a necessity for human sur-vival and well-being, and argued that the social impli-cations of morality, including natural rights, were sim-ply a subset of the wider eld of ethics. Thus, for Rand,virtue included productiveness, honesty with oneself,and scrupulousness of thought. Although she greatly ad-mired Jeerson, she also wrote:[To those who say] that morality is socialand that man would need no morality on adesert islandit is on a desert island that hewould need it most. Let him try to claim, whentherearenovictimstopayforit, thatarockisahouse, that sand is clothing, that food will dropinto his mouth without cause or eort, that hewill collect a harvest tomorrow by devouringhisstockseedtodayandrealitywillwipehimout, as he deserves; reality will show him thatlife is a value to be bought and that thinking isthe only coin noble enough to buy it. <\/p>\n
[22] <\/p>\n
In <\/p>\n
The Moral Point of View <\/p>\n
,Kurt Baierobjects that eth-ical egoism provides no moral basis for the resolution ofconicts of interest, which, in his opinion, form the onlyvindication for a moral code. Were this an ideal world,one in which interests and purposes never jarred, its in-habitants would have no need of a specied set of ethics,accordingtoBaier. This,however,isnotanidealworld.Baier believes that ethical egoism fails to provide themoral guidance and arbitration that it necessitates. Farfrom resolving conicts of interest, claimed Baier, ethi-cal egoism all too often spawns them. To this, as Rachelshas shown, the ethical egoist may object that he cannotadmitaconstructofmoralitywhoseaimismerelytofore-stall conicts of interest. On his view, he writes, themoralist is not like a courtroom judge, who resolves dis-putes. Instead, he is like the Commissioner of Boxing,who urges each ghter to do his best. <\/p>\n
[23] <\/p>\n
Baiers is also part of a team of philosophers who holdthat ethical egoism is paradoxical, implying that to dowhat is in ones best interests can be both wrong and rightin ethical terms. Although a successful pursuit of self-interest may be viewed as a moral victory, it could also bedubbed immoral if it prevents another person from exe-cuting what is in <\/p>\n
his <\/p>\n
best interests. Again, however, theethical egoists have responded by assuming the guise ofthe Commissioner of Boxing. His philosophy precludesempathy for the interests of others, so forestalling themis perfectly acceptable. Regardless of whether we thinkthis is a correct view, adds Rachels, it is, at the veryleast, a <\/p>\n
consistent <\/p>\n
view, and so this attempt to convict theegoist of self-contradiction fails. <\/p>\n
[24] <\/p>\n
Finally, it has been averred that ethical egoism is no bet-ter thanbigotryin that, likeracism, it divides people into two types themselves and others and discriminatesagainst one type on the basis of some arbitrary disparity.This, to Rachelss mind, is probably the best objectionto ethical egoism, for it provides the soundest reason why <\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Read more:<\/p>\n
Ethical Egoism | Psychological Egoism<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 3isminthewaythatpost-ChristianWesterncivilizationhasdone.Aristotle's view is that we have duties to ourselvesas well as to other people (e.g. Continue reading