Heidegger and posthumanism <\/p>\n
Tags: Being and Time; The Question Concerning Technology; Only a God Can Save Us; Letter on Humanism; Dasein; technicity; temporality <\/p>\n
The relationship between Heidegger and posthumanism can be understood as taking at least two basic forms, each of which corresponds to different understandings of posthumanism itself. The first is inherent within Heideggers goal of replacing dualistic Cartesianism with Dasein[i] and being-in-the-world. In offering this Being-centric ontology, Heidegger first removes the human subject from its central place in Western philosophy, and second undermines the metaphysical dualism that has defined the structures of humanist philosophies since Descartes. The second form concerns the complex relationship humans have to technology as it influences how Dasein relates to its own being-in-the-world. <\/p>\n
Heideggers philosophy is based on an inquiry into the nature of being, which he claims is at once the most fundamental question of existence and the most difficult to consider (Being 1996: 2f). In Being and Time Heidegger offers Dasein as the primary mode of existence. Dasein, in its most basic sense, is the kind of existence experienced by individuals who make their own Being an issue for themselves; that is, they live philosophically and self-reflexively. Crucially, Dasein is also inseparable from its spatial and temporal contexts. This relationship, being-in-the-world, is not external to Dasein, rather it is an a priori condition within the construction of Dasein itself. No longer is the world a collection of extended material objects for perception by a thinking mind as Descartes described it, Heideggers formulation binds the world to Dasein as an intrinsic existential element. This relationship between Dasein and being-in-the-world has also influenced prominent posthumanists: eg. N. Katherine Hayles dream of a posthumanism, in which humans no longer see their bodies as mere fashion accessories, but rather as integral parts of their (post)human existence in-the-world (Hayles 1999: 5). <\/p>\n
Daseins interactions with objects within the world are likewise now understood in relational, rather than oppositional terms. For Heidegger, objects may appear as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. Those things presenting themselves as ready-to-hand, for which Heidegger also uses the word equipment [Zeug], are understood by Dasein in terms of their use, as well as within their particular spheres of association. A claw hammer, for example, is understood as a tool for pounding and pulling nails, but also as an element of the larger sphere of carpentry, implying through its own readiness-to-hand, nails, lumber, saws, etc. (Being 66f). Contrary to readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand is the quality of objects that simply exist within the world, but not usefully; however, since presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand are not intrinsic qualities of the objects themselves, a change in Daseins relation to a particular object can also cause a shift between these two categories. <\/p>\n
Heideggers influence on posthumanism can be seen in the conflict between his relational ontology and the Cartesian dualism that he is working against. This dualism often underpins imaginings of artificial intelligence, mind uploading, and collective intelligences in popular posthumanism; however, as N. Katherine Hayles and Hubert Dreyfus both argue, this need not be the case. In fact, Heideggers construction of Dasein as a self-reflexive kind of existence exhibited exclusively by humans has been the topic of some debate within posthumanism. The possibility of non-human Dasein is explored in both animal studies and philosophies of artificial intelligence, which further contribute to the gradual dissolution of anthropocentrism of philosophy since the Enlightenment.[ii] [iii] <\/p>\n
Heideggers later work in The Question Concerning Technology assumes the basic ontological structure outlined above and focuses on the problematic way humans relate to the world of, and through, advanced technology. Technology is both an instrument used toward an end and an end in itself, but crucially, it is primarily a way in which humans relate to the world (Question 1977: 294f) Relating to the world technologically, for Heidegger, means not just interactions with objects within the world. Rather, relating to objects technologically means seeing them as standing reserve for the accomplishment of some other goal (298). Heidegger takes as his example the juxtaposition between a bridge depicted in Hlderlins poem The Rhine and a modern day hydroelectric plant on the eponymous river (297). The natural beauty of the river coupled with the human addition of the bridge that Hlderlin depicts reflects a harmonious relationship between humans, the river, the raw materials of the bridge, and the will and effort that went into constructing it, all of which reinforce the unified construction being-in-the-world that describes Daseins embeddedness within its environment. The opposite of this is the monstrousness of the hydroelectric plant as it reduces the river to a mere means for water power by diverting the flow, controlling the water level, and altering the natural ecosystem of the area. Additionally, by reducing one area of the Rhine to a mere producer of energy, it also corrupts the purity of other areas where nature has been left untouched by turning them into real or potential areas of tourist exploitation (ibid.). <\/p>\n
The danger of seeing the world as standing reserve is that it prevents Dasein from understanding the world and its inhabitants as integral parts of its own existence, which ultimately dissociates Dasein from its essential embeddedness in-the-world. The view that humans are standing reserve in the form of electro-chemical machines, or are machine-like bodies that are ontologically compatible with computers, is a defining element of functionalist philosophy, as well as popular posthumanism. Heideggers argument warns against the view that the integration of human bodies and minds with computers (a central motif in the cyberpunk genre, but also many non science fiction texts, is either possible or desirablea view which is taken up and expanded by Hayles (1999). For Heidegger, the ontology of Dasein exists separately from the digital spaces created by humans, and trying to merge them is an attempt to dismantle Daseins fundamental being-in-the-world, which thereby also reduces Dasein itself to an exploitable means. <\/p>\n
In Only a God Can Save Us published posthumously in Der Spiegel, Heidegger attempts to clarify his attitude toward technology further. Advanced modern technology, as well as the culture and economy that have created it, have together promoted an understanding of the world and other humans as mere standing reserve and have thereby formed a culture of technicity (Only a God 2009: 331). In Heideggers view cybernetics (and physics generally) has taken over the role that philosophy once played for humans. As a result technology has surpassed the control of humanity; it no longer corresponds to the embeddedness Dasein has in-the-world (327f; cf. also Hassan 1977).[iv] For Heidegger, the relationship of humans to modern technology must change to one that no longer alienates Dasein from its interconnectedness in-the-world, a change that will have to come from both the return of humans to being-in-the-world and simultaneously through humans own relationship to technicity (331f.). <\/p>\n
It is worth stressing, however, that Heideggers is not a technophobic position; rather, he advocates reworking the relationship between humans and modern technology so that technology neither distances humans from their embeddedness in-the-world nor reduces people or the world to standing reserve. This view places Heidegger in opposition to versions of posthumanism that allow for, or indeed are built upon, mind-uploading, body enhancement, and, space exploration (Only a God 2009: 325). Apart from providing the philosophical basis for N. Katherine Hayless How We Became Posthuman, Heideggers thought has also helped to raise the question of whether non-human Dasein may be extended to animals, robots, and artificial intelligences. While Heideggers relationship to humanism generally is complicated, in this respect his views remain fundamentally humanist. Humans, for Heidegger, are the only beings capable of existing in-the-world as such because they are world-forming. Animals, on the other hand, are world-impoverished in that they are capable of being affected by beings, but are not able to execute the agency inherent in the world-forming quality of Dasein (Collected 1975: 261f.). These humanistic beliefs complicate his views of humanism generally as they are expressed in Letter on Humanism. Here he views humanism as valuing beings over those beings relationship to Being itself. <\/p>\n
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Heidegger, Martin<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Heidegger and posthumanism Tags: Being and Time; The Question Concerning Technology; Only a God Can Save Us; Letter on Humanism; Dasein; technicity; temporality The relationship between Heidegger and posthumanism can be understood as taking at least two basic forms, each of which corresponds to different understandings of posthumanism itself. Continue reading