{"id":1075274,"date":"2023-11-16T15:06:14","date_gmt":"2023-11-16T20:06:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.immortalitymedicine.tv\/how-the-ai-executive-order-and-omb-memo-introduce-brookings-institution\/"},"modified":"2024-08-18T12:48:20","modified_gmt":"2024-08-18T16:48:20","slug":"how-the-ai-executive-order-and-omb-memo-introduce-brookings-institution","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/artificial-general-intelligence\/how-the-ai-executive-order-and-omb-memo-introduce-brookings-institution.php","title":{"rendered":"How the AI Executive Order and OMB memo introduce &#8230; &#8211; Brookings Institution"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>      President Biden recently signed the       Executive Order (EO) on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy      Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence. With      sections on privacy, content verification, and immigration of      tech workers (to name just a few areas), the executive order      is sweeping. Encouragingly, it introduces key guardrails for      the use of AI and takes important steps to protect peoples      rights. It is also inherently limited: Unlike acts of      Congress, executive actions cannot create new agencies or      grant new regulatory powers over private companies. (They can      also be undone by the next president.) The EO was followed      two days later by a       draft memorandum, now open for public comment, from the Office of      Management and Budget (OMB) with additional guidance for the      federal government to manage risks and mandate accountability      while advancing innovation in AI. Taken together, these two      government directives offer one of the most detailed pictures      of how governments should establish rules and guidance around      AI.    <\/p>\n<p>      Notably, these actions towards accountability focus on      current harms and not existential risk, and thus can serve as      useful guides to policymakers focused on the everyday      concerns of their constituents. Beyond executive action, with      its inherent limits, the next step will be for other      policymakersfrom Congress to the statesto use these      documents as a guide for future action in requiring      accountability in the use of AI.    <\/p>\n<p>      As we analyze the EO and the OMB memo alongside each other      for accountability directions, here is what stands out:    <\/p>\n<p>        Impact on        government use of AI      <\/p>\n<p>      The executive order (in Section 10.1(b)) gives explicit      guidance to federal agencies for using AI in ways that      protect safety and rights. The section outlines contents of      the draft OMB memo released for public comment two days after the      EO. In what may become a model for AI governance from      localities, to states, to international governing agreements,      the OMB memo,       Advancing Governance, Innovation, and Risk Management for      Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence, requires specific      AI guardrails.    <\/p>\n<p>      Critically, the memo includes definitions of safety- and      rights-impacting AI as well as lists of systems      presumed to be safety- and-rights impacting. This      approach builds on work done over the past decade to document      the      harms of algorithmic systems in mediating critical      services and impacting peoples vital opportunities. By      taking this presumptive approach, rather than requiring      agencies start from scratch with risk assessments on      every system, the OMB memo also reduces the      administrative burden on agencies and allows decision-makers      to move directly to instituting appropriate guardrails and      accountability practices. Systems can also be added or      removed from the list based on a conducted risk assessment.    <\/p>\n<p>      Once an AI system is identified as safety- or      rights-impacting, the draft OMB memo specifies a minimum set      of practices that must be in place before and during its use.      As required by the executive order, these practices build on      those identified in the Blueprint      for an AI Bill of Rights. This detailed section of the      memo leads off with impact assessments and lists three key      areas that agencies must assess before a system is      put into use: intended purpose and expected benefit;      potential risks to a broad range of stakeholder groups; and      quality and appropriateness of the data the AI model is built      from. Should the assessing agency conclude that the systems      benefits do not meaningfully outweigh the risks, agencies      should not use the AI. The memo also directs agencies to      assess, through this process, whether the AI system is fit      for the task at hand; this is a critical effort to make sure      AI actually works, when many times it      has been shown not to, and to assess whether AI is the      right solution to the given problem,       countering the tendency to assume it is.    <\/p>\n<p>      The OMB memo goes on to require a range of accountability      processes, including human fallback, the mitigation of new or      emerging risks to rights and safety, ongoing assessment      throughout a systems lifecycle, assessment for bias, and      consultation and feedback from affected groups. Taken      together, if carried through to the final version of the      memo, these requirements create a remarkable step forward in      establishing an accountability ecosystemnot one point of      intervention, but many methodologies and practices that,      working together over time and at multiple stages in an AI      lifecycle, could represent meaningful controls.    <\/p>\n<p>      Importantly, the OMB memo requires agencies to stop      using an AI system if these practices are not in place. The      minimum practices additionally include instructions to      reconsider use of a system if concerning outcomes, such as      discrimination, are found through testing.    <\/p>\n<p>      Public accountability will be challenging, given the breadth      and complexity of these practices. One key accountability      mechanism used will be annual reporting, as part of an      expanded AI use case inventory. However, the details of what      will be reported were not included as part of the memorandum      and will be determined later by OMB.       Journalists and       researchers have identified problems with the previous      practices of the AI use case inventory, including both that      agencies left known AI uses off their inventory and that the      reporting requirements were minimal and did not include      testing and bias assessment results. Looking forward,      effectiveness of the AI use case inventory as an      accountability mechanism will depend on whether existing      loopholes and under-reporting concerns are addressed through      the OMB process to come. Its also important to      consider that the effectiveness of      transparency reporting on AI systems as an accountability      mechanism has also been more broadly challenged.    <\/p>\n<p>      Throughout the guidance, OMB refers to requirements for      government use of AI. This phrase, importantly, covers both      AI that is developed and then used by the federal government,      and AI that is procured by the government. By using      the power of the governments purse, the guidance also has      the potential to influence the private sector as well. OMB      also commits to developing further guidance for AI contracts      that aligns with what it has laid out so far in this draft      memo. That current guidance is rigorous; if those same      provisions are successfully required for government      purchasing of AI, it will significantly shape how government      AI vendors are building and testing their products.    <\/p>\n<p>        Impact on the        private sector      <\/p>\n<p>      The president only has so many levers to pull through an      executive order to regulate private industry. Because the EO      cannot make new laws, it relies on existing agency and      presidential authorities (and the development of procurement      rules described above) to influence how private companies are      developing and deploying AI systems. Within that scope, the      regulatory impact of the EO on the private sector could still      be far-reaching.    <\/p>\n<p>      The EO directs agencies with enforcement powers to deepen      their understanding of their capacities in the context of AI,      to coordinate, and to develop guidance and potentially      additional regulations to protect civil rights and civil      liberties in the broader marketplaceas well as to protect      consumers from fraud, discrimination, and other risks,      including risks to financial stability, and specifically to      protect privacy. Sections 7 through 9 address various aspects      of this, starting by directing the attorney general to      assemble the heads of federal civil rights offices, including      those of enforcement agencies, to determine how to apply and      potentially expand the reach of civil rights law across the      government to address existing harms.    <\/p>\n<p>      Additionally,       the President calls on Congress to pass federal data privacy      protections, and then through the EOs Section 9 directs      agencies to do what they can to protect peoples data privacy      without Congressional action. The section opener calls out      not only AIs facilitation of the collection or use of      information about individuals, but also specifically the      making of inferences about individuals. This could open up a      broader approach to assessing privacy violations, along the      lines of       networked privacy and associated      harms, which considers not only individual personal      identifiable information but the inferences that can be drawn      by looking at connected data about an individual, or      relationships between individuals.    <\/p>\n<p>      The EO directs agencies to revisit the guidelines for privacy      impact assessments in the context of AI, as well as to assess      and potentially issue guidelines on the use of      privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), such as differential            privacy. Though brief, the EOs privacy section pushes to      expand the understanding of data privacy and the remedies      that might be taken to address novel and emerging harms. As      those ideas move through government, they will inevitably      inform potential data protection and privacy laws at the      federal and (more likely) state level that will govern      private industry.    <\/p>\n<p>      Its not surprising that generative AI was given a prominent      treatment in the executive order: systems like ChatGPT that      can generate text in response to prompts and other systems      that can generate images, video, or audio, have catapulted      concerns about AI into the public consciousness. Concerns      have ranged from the technologys potential to       replace skilled writers to its       reinforcement of degrading stereotypes to the       overblown notion that it will       end humanity as we know it. Yet these systems are largely      created by the private sector, and without new legislation      the White House has limited levers to require these companies      to act responsibly. There is an unfolding, live debate about      whether to       treat generative AI systems differently than other AI      systems. The EOs authors choose to differentiate      generative AI in Section 4, and have drawn      criticism for that decision; a better approach may have      been the one taken in the OMB memo where the same protections      are required for generative AI as other AI and the focus is      on the potential harms of the system.    <\/p>\n<p>      To govern generative AI systems, the executive order invokes      the Defense      Production Act. Introduced during the Korean War and also      used for       production of masks and       ventilators during the COVID pandemic, the Defense      Production Act gives the president the authority to expedite      and expand industrial production in order to promote national      defense. The executive order (in Section 4.2(i)) uses it to      require private companies to preemptively test their      models for specific safety concerns; it also specifies      red-teaming as the testing methodology. Red-teaming is a      practice of having a team external to the development of a      system (but potentially still within the company) stress-test      the system for specific concerns. The executive order      requires that companies perform red-teaming in line with      guidance from NIST that will be developed per Section      4.1(ii). Companies must report the resulting documentation of      safety testing practices and results to the federal      government.    <\/p>\n<p>      This AI accountability modelpreemptive testing according to      specific standards and associated reporting requirementsis      potentially useful. Unfortunately, the specifics in this case      leave much to be desired. First, given the use of the Defense      Production Act, the testing and reporting the EO requires are      limited to concerns relating to national defense and the      protection of critical infrastructure, including      cybersecurity and bioweapons. Yet as public debate has shown,      concerns about generative AI go well beyond these limited      settings. Second, the specific definitions used in the      executive order to determine which systems must adhere to      these standards       appear to have been copied wholesale from a policy      document put forth by OpenAI and other authors. Its      thresholds for model size have little substantive      justification; this means that future technological      developments may render them under-inclusive or otherwise      ineffective in targeting the systems with the most potential      for harm. Finally, the executive order positions AI      red-teaming as the singular AI accountability mechanism to be      used for generative AI, when       AI red-teaming works best in combination with other      accountability mechanisms. By contrast, the OMB guidance      for AI use by the federal government, which will also be      required for generative AI, requires multiple accountability      mechanisms including       algorithmic impact assessments and       public consultation. The full landscape of AI      accountability mechanisms should be applied to generative AI      by private companies as well.    <\/p>\n<p>      Consistent with the EOs broad approach, the order addresses      AIs worker impacts in multiple ways. First, while research      suggests a more complicated picture on technological      automation and work, the EO sets out to support workers      during an AI transition. To that end, the EO directs the      chairman of the presidents Council of Economic Advisers to      prepare and submit a report to the president on the      labor-market effects of AI. Section 6(a)(ii) mandates that      the secretary of labor submit to the president a report      analyzing how federal agencies may support workers displaced      by the adoption of AI and other technological advancements.    <\/p>\n<p>      Alongside the focus on AI displacement, the EO recognizes      that       automated decision systems are already in use in the      workplace and directs attention to their ongoing impacts on      job quality, worker power, and worker health and safety. The      most encompassing directive lies in Section 6(b), which      directs the secretary of labor, working with other agencies      and outside entities, including labor unions and workers,      to develop principles and best practices to mitigate harms      to employees well-being. The best practices must cover      labor standards and job quality, and the EO further      encourages federal agencies to adopt the guidelines in      their internal programs.    <\/p>\n<p>      Section 7.3 of the EO directs the labor department to publish      guidance for federal contractors regarding nondiscrimination      in hiring involving AI and other technology-based hiring      systems. Given the       overwhelming       evidence that algorithmic systems replicate and reinforce      human biases, the broad language of other      technology-based hiring systems is a major opportunity      for the DOL to model standards of nondiscriminatory hiring.    <\/p>\n<p>      While the EOs worker protections are only guidance and best      practices, the OMB memo directly mandates protocols to      support workers and their rights when agencies use AI. The      memo applies the minimum risk management practices where AI      is used to determine the terms and conditions of      employment. This broad definition positions the      federal government, as the nations largest employer, to      influence the use of AI systems within the workplace. The      memo also requires that human remedies are in place in some      cases, a requirement that may add jobs, adding      complexity to concerns about the labor-market effects of AI.      Further, the OMB memos requirement that federal agencies      consult and incorporate feedback from affected groups      positions workers and unions to influence the deployment of      AI technology, which aligns with calls from civil society and      academia to ensure that the people most likely to be affected      by technology       should have influence into that systems design and      deployment.    <\/p>\n<p>        How will this all        get done?      <\/p>\n<p>      The narrative that the federal government is not      knowledgeable about AI systems should be laid to rest by      these recent documents. There was clearly a lot of thought      put into the design and implementation of a national AI      governance model. That said, its also clear that many more      people representing the right mix of expertise will be needed      quickly to implement this ambitious plan on the      tight timeline laid out in the orderand on the implicit      deadline marked by the end of the Biden administrations      first term. Given that the EO and the OMB memo collectively      run to well over 100 pages of actions that the federal      government should take to address AI, the question looms:      who will do all this work?    <\/p>\n<p>      A major new role addressed in both the EO and the OMB memo is      that of the Chief AI Officer (CAIO), which every agency head      is required to designate within 60 days of the EOs      enactment. The CAIOs responsibilities are laid out in the      OMB memo and fall into three categories: coordinating agency      use of AI, promoting AI innovation, and managing risks from      AI use. The way the CAIO role is understood and filled will      be critical to what comes next; if agencies interpret the      role as solely or primarily a technical one, rather than one      focused societally on opportunities and risks related to the      public interest use of AI, they may pursue very different      implementation priorities than those articulated by the EO.      CAIOs are also responsible for agency-level AI strategies,      which are due within one year of the EOs launch. The      strategies seem likely to call for increased headcount and      new expertise in government.    <\/p>\n<p>      The EO has anticipated the need for both bringing new talent      into the government and building the skills and capacities of      civil servants on AI matters. The federal government has long      been criticized for its slow, difficult hiring processes,      making it tremendously challenging for an administration to      pivot attention to an emerging issue. This administration has      tried to preempt this criticism through the announcement of      AI talent surge specified in Section 10.2 of the EO. That      section gives OSTP and OMB a spare 45 days to figure out how      to get the needed people into government, including through      the establishment of a cross-agency AI and Technology Talent      Task Force. The federal government has already started some      of that recruitment push in the launch of a new AI jobs website.    <\/p>\n<p>      What is potentially most challenging in recruiting AI      talent is identifying the actual skills, capacities, and      expertise needed to implement the EOs many angles. While      there is a need, of course, for technological talent, much of      what the EO calls for, particularly in the area of protecting      rights and ensuring safety, requires interdisciplinary      expertise. What the EO requires is the creation of new      knowledge about how to governindeed, what the role of      government is in an increasingly data-centric and AI-mediated      environment. These are questions for teams with a sociotechnical      lens, requiring expertise in a range of disciplines,      including legal scholarship, the social and behavioral      sciences, computer and data science, and often, specific      field knowledgehealth and human services, the criminal legal      system, financial markets and consumer financial protection,      and so on. Such skills will especially be key for the second      pillar of the administrations talent surgethe growth in      regulatory and enforcement capacity needed to keep watch over      the powerful AI companies. Its also critical to ensure that      these teams are built with attention to equity at the center.      Given the broad      empirical base that demonstrates the disproportionate      harms of AI systems to historically marginalized groups, and      the Presidents declared commitment to       advancing racial equity across the federal government,      equity in both hiring and as a focus of implementation must      be a top priority of all aspects of EO implementation.    <\/p>\n<p>      As broad as the EO is, there are critical areas of concern      that have either been pushed off to later consideration, or      avoided. For instance, the EO includes a national security      carveout, with direction to develop separate guidance in 270      days to address the governance of AI used as a component of      a national security system or for military and intelligence      purposes; many applications of AI could potentially fall      within those criteria. The EO also doesnt take the      opportunity to ban specific practices shown to be harmful or      ineffective; an example where it could have taken further      action is in       banning the use of affective computing in law      enforcement. The EO addresses the potential for AI to be      valuable in climate science and the mitigation of climate      change; however, it does nothing about AIs own       environmental      impact,      missing an opportunity to force reporting on energy and water      usage by companies creating some of the biggest AI systems.      Lastly, the EO sets guidelines for the use of AI by federal      agencies and contractors but does not attach any requirements      or guidance for recipients of federal grants, such as cities      and states.    <\/p>\n<p>      Finally, the EO addresses research in a number of points      throughout the document and references research on a range of      topics and through many vehicles, including an National      Science Foundation (NSF) Regional Innovation Engine and four      NSF AI Research Institutes, to join the 25 already      established. Yet the EO doesnt include major *new*      commitments to research funding. A more robust approach to      addressing AI research and education in the EO could have      been a statement that reframed the national AI research and      development field as sociotechnical, rather than purely      technicalproactively focused on interdisciplinary approaches      that center societal impacts of AI alongside technological      advancement. Such a statement would have aligned meaningfully      with Vice President Kamala Harriss November 1st 2023 speech      at the UK AI Safety Summit in which she argued for a future      where AI is used to advance the public interest.    <\/p>\n<p>      If the administration is indeed committed to seeing AI in      the public interest, as Vice President Harris indicated,      its new EO and OMB guidance are the clearest indication of      how it intends to meet that ambition: mandating hard      accountability to protect rights, regulating private      industry, and moving iteratively, so that governance efforts      advance alongside the field of sociotechnical research. But      the executive branch can only do so much. Ultimately, the EO      can be readamong other waysas a roadmap for Congress to      legislate. Additionally, cities, states, and other countries      should understand these new documents as direction-setting      and could choose to rapidly align their policies with these      documents to create more comprehensive rights and safety      protections.    <\/p>\n<p><!-- Auto Generated --><\/p>\n<p>Continue reading here: <\/p>\n<p><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/how-the-ai-executive-order-and-omb-memo-introduce-accountability-for-artificial-intelligence\/\" title=\"How the AI Executive Order and OMB memo introduce ... - Brookings Institution\">How the AI Executive Order and OMB memo introduce ... - Brookings Institution<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p> President Biden recently signed the Executive Order (EO) on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence. With sections on privacy, content verification, and immigration of tech workers (to name just a few areas), the executive order is sweeping. Encouragingly, it introduces key guardrails for the use of AI and takes important steps to protect peoples rights.  <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/artificial-general-intelligence\/how-the-ai-executive-order-and-omb-memo-introduce-brookings-institution.php\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"limit_modified_date":"","last_modified_date":"","_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1234933],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1075274","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-artificial-general-intelligence"],"modified_by":null,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1075274"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1075274"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1075274\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1075274"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1075274"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.euvolution.com\/futurist-transhuman-news-blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1075274"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}